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341 
IS BARRIOS THE DEATH KNELL OF BOSH CLAIMS? 
THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY BATTLE BETWEEN 
THE OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT AND 
LEGISLATURE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 
HAYLEY STILLWELL*  
Introduction 
The mission of the Founding Fathers, in large part, was to make America 
as different from England as possible. But not everything learned from 
England was rebelliously discarded. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
that “the king can do no wrong,” made its way across the Atlantic and is 
still today embedded in the fabric of American jurisprudence. Put simply, 
this doctrine means that a sovereign cannot be sued unless it consents.1 This 
idea is not rooted in the United States Constitution, or any other written law 
from the legislature.2 Instead, sovereign immunity emerged in American 
jurisprudence via the common law,3 with courts recognizing it as “an 
inherent right [of a sovereign] to protect itself against suits,”4 a “universally 
received” concept,5 and “an established principle of jurisprudence.”6 
The State of Oklahoma has explicitly adopted sovereign immunity for a 
broad array of tort claims, including constitutional torts—legal wrongs by 
government actors in violation of duties imposed by the Oklahoma 
                                                                                                                 
 * Hayley Stillwell is a former Oklahoma Supreme Court staff attorney and current 
federal district court term law clerk, with plans to continue clerking on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth and Second Circuits. She graduated from the University of Oklahoma 
College of Law in 2017 with highest honors.  
 1. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 226 (1882); The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
152, 153–54 (1868); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857). 
 2. Lee, 106 U.S. at 207 (“[T]he principle [of sovereign immunity] has never been 
discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established 
doctrine.”) (citing United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834); United States v. 
McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386 
(1850); Nations v. Johnson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 195 (1860); Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 152; 
The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15 (1869)). 
 3. Vanderpool v. State, 1983 OK 82, ¶ 8, 672 P.2d 1153, 1154 (“The doctrine [of 
sovereign immunity] found its way into the common law of the United States, and in 
1821, . . . [it was] applied . . . in suits against the United States, declaring that suits could not 
be commenced or prosecuted against the federal government without its consent. 
Subsequently, the doctrine was applied to the states.”).  
 4. Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1868). 
 5. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411 (1821). 
 6. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 529. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
342 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:341 
 
 
Constitution. In the years before and after this explicit invocation of 
sovereign immunity for constitutional torts, however, the question in 
Oklahoma was whether the Oklahoma Legislature had the authority to do 
this. Even though the Oklahoma Legislature enacted a statute that invoked 
sovereign immunity as to certain torts, utilizing a seemingly all-
encompassing definition of “tort,” the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
nevertheless found that private rights of action—commonly referred to as 
“Bosh claims”—existed for violations of the Oklahoma Constitution.7 The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court offered no useful reasoning for this finding, but 
it could be inferred that it must have viewed constitutional tort rights of 
action as arising out of the Oklahoma Constitution itself, not the common 
law, because the court validated these actions notwithstanding the 
legislature’s attempt to invoke sovereign immunity for the same. 
In its recent decision, Barrios v. Haskell County Public Facilities, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court confronted the aforementioned question head-on 
and reversed course, finding that the Legislature is free to limit monetary 
remedies available for such tort claims because private rights of action for 
violations of the Oklahoma Constitution are products of common law.8 
Thus, courts will not recognize new Bosh claims, and previously recognized 
Bosh claims may not even be recognized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
going forward. This result is technically correct because it is consistent with 
the Constitutions of the United States and Oklahoma, as well as relevant 
policies. But it is functionally deficient in that it limits the remedy for 
violations of certain Oklahoma constitutional provisions to prospective 
injunctive relief, providing no redress for violations of the past. This result 
fails to appreciate the purpose of a remedy, which is to make the injured 
whole and deter legal wrongs. The Barrios decision, in contravention of the 
Oklahoma Constitution, effectively leaves constitutional rights that may 
only be vindicated with prospective injunctive relief, without remedies and 
should, therefore, be reconsidered by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.  
Part I of this Note analyzes the development of sovereign immunity as to 
torts in Oklahoma’s jurisprudence. Part II provides an overview of the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s Barrios opinion that addresses whether a 
private right of action exists in tort for violations of the Oklahoma 
Constitution even though the Legislature says otherwise. In addition, it 
comments on the timing of relevant legislative amendments and Oklahoma 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Bosh v. Cherokee Cty. Governmental Bldg. Auth., 2013 OK 9, ¶ 23, 305 P.3d 994, 
1001. 
 8. 2018 OK 9, ¶¶ 17–18, 432 P.3d 233, 240–41. 
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Supreme Court decisions, arguably exposing contradictory views. It also 
summarizes the state of the law following Barrios and provides insight into 
how the Oklahoma Supreme Court is likely to treat both previously-
recognized and new constitutional tort claims, commonly referred to as 
“Bosh claims.” Finally, Part III analyzes Barrios’s validity in light of the 
United States and Oklahoma Constitutions and relevant policy 
considerations. While the result in Barrios may technically be correct, it 
functionally leaves certain Oklahoma constitutional rights without a 
remedy, which creates a conflict with the Oklahoma Constitution. Thus, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court should examine more closely whether 
prospective injunctive relief, without more, remedies past constitutional 
violations and ensure that its holding in Barrios does not inadvertently 
deteriorate any Oklahoma constitutional rights.  
I. Tort Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence in Oklahoma 
A. “Goes Without Saying” to “Only Goes If You Say It” 
Sovereign immunity from tort suit in Oklahoma was recognized as an 
inherent power of the state9 until the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that 
the reason for this rule no longer existed.10 In adherence with the national 
trend at the time to retreat from governmental immunity as a bar to claims 
based in tort,11 the Oklahoma Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity as to the State of Oklahoma in Vanderpool.12 Although 
the court opined that “[w]here the reason for the rule no longer exists, that 
alone should toll its death knell,”13 it importantly noted its decision was 
“not to be taken as in any way rendering ineffective any act of the 
Legislature in the area of governmental immunity whether presently in 
effect or hereafter passed.”14  
Accordingly, while there was no need for the State to affirmatively 
invoke its sovereign immunity before Vanderpool, subsequently, the State 
must explicitly invoke its sovereign immunity to enjoy immunity from suit. 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See Vanderpool v. State, 1983 OK 82, ¶¶ 7–8, 672 P.2d 1153, 1154. 
 10. Id. ¶ 24, 672 P.2d at 1157. 
 11. Id. ¶ 19, 672 P.2d at 1156. 
 12. Id. ¶¶ 19–25, 672 P.2d at 1156–57. 
 13. Id. ¶ 24, 672 P.2d at 1157. 
 14. Id. ¶ 25, 672 P.2d at 1157. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
344 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:341 
 
 
This is exactly what the Oklahoma Legislature did in 1984 when it enacted 
the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (OGTCA).15 
B. The Oklahoma Legislature Strikes Back  
The Oklahoma Legislature heard the Vanderpool Court loud and clear, 
announcing via the OGTCA that “[t]he State of Oklahoma does hereby 
adopt the doctrine of sovereign immunity []” from tort suits.16 At the time, 
the OGTCA defined “tort” as 
a legal wrong, independent of contract, involving violation of a 
duty imposed by general law or otherwise, resulting in a loss to 
any person, association or corporation as the proximate result of 
an act or omission of a political subdivision or the state or an 
employee acting within the scope of employment.17 
This broad definition of “tort” seemed to demonstrate the Legislature’s 
intent to invoke sovereign immunity for every possible non-contractual 
legal wrong that fit the remaining definitional and statutory requirements. 
Although the Oklahoma Legislature expressly and broadly invoked 
sovereign immunity as to torts generally, it simultaneously waived 
sovereign immunity for certain torts specified in the OGTCA.18 As a result, 
“in cases including tort claims against the State and state actors . . . the 
State is statutorily immune from tort suit unless the Legislature has 
expressly waived that immunity.”19 
C. The Oklahoma Supreme Court and Constitutional Torts 
In the following years, the Oklahoma Supreme Court grappled with 
claims wherein a plaintiff was allegedly deprived of an Oklahoma 
constitutional right and the State invoked its sovereign immunity to avoid 
tort liability for that deprivation under the OGTCA. This presented the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court with the opportunity to address whether a tort 
right of action exists for a violation of an Oklahoma constitutional right 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Ch. 226, § 3(A), 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws 811, 813 (codified at 51 OKLA. STAT. § 
152.1(A) (2011)). 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. § 2(11), 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws at 813 (current version at 51 OKLA. STAT. § 
152(14) (Supp. 2018)). 
 18. Id. § 3(B), 1984 Okla. Sess. Laws at 813 (codified at 51 OKLA. STAT. § 152.1(B) 
(2011)). 
 19. Barrios v. Haskell Cty. Pub. Facilities Auth., 2018 OK 90, ¶ 8, 432 P.3d 233, 237. 
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notwithstanding the OGTCA, which seemed to broadly immunize the State 
from liability for all torts—even constitutional torts. 
1. Washington v. Barry 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court first encountered the aforementioned 
scenario in Washington v. Barry.20 The Washington Court analyzed whether 
a plaintiff-inmate stated a cause of action for the use of excessive force, in 
violation of the Oklahoma Constitution,21 by prison guards who were State 
employees.22 Prison officials at the facility in which the plaintiff was 
housed determined that another inmate was to be housed in the same cell.23 
When plaintiff objected, prison authorities subsequently placed him in leg 
irons and other restraints in order to move the new inmate into his cell.24 
Plaintiff-inmate then refused to allow prison guards to remove his restraints 
and even slept in them for a night.25 Plaintiff alleged that as a result of the 
forcible removal of his restraints, he received a cut and a swollen eye, and 
“suffer[ed] from dizziness, severe back and neck pain, and blurred 
vision.”26 He did not seek, nor require, any medical attention following this 
incident.27 
In its analysis of whether plaintiff-inmate stated a cause of action, the 
Washington Court considered his claim in the context of the OGTCA.28 The 
court’s analysis was limited, however, to a discussion of what “scope of 
employment” meant and how it related to plaintiff’s allegation against the 
prison guards individually.29 Here, plaintiff-inmate attempted to avoid the 
application of the OGTCA (and state sovereign immunity) by only suing 
the prison guards individually, and not the State.30 His attempt failed. The 
court held that a plaintiff “may not avoid the immunities granted by and the 
requirements of the Governmental Tort Claims Act by simply declining to 
join the state as a party, although he claims the prison employee defendants 
were acting within the scope of their employment.”31 This was the extent of 
                                                                                                                 
 20. 2002 OK 45, 55 P.3d 1036. 
 21. Id. ¶ 5, 55 P.3d at 1038. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. ¶ 2, 55 P.3d at 1037. 
 24. Id. ¶ 2, 55 P.3d at 1037–38. 
 25. Id. ¶ 2, 55 P.3d at 1038. 
 26. Id. ¶ 3, 55 P.3d at 1038. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. ¶¶ 6–8, 55 P.3d at 1038–39. 
 29. Id.  
 30. See id. ¶¶ 6–7, 55 P.3d at 1038–39. 
 31. Id. ¶ 8, 55 P.3d at 1039. 
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the Washington Court’s discussion about plaintiff-inmate’s claims and the 
OGTCA. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court then discussed a “potential” cause of 
action plaintiff-inmate could have brought but failed to raise.32 This is 
arguably dicta, however, as the court was asked to decide whether plaintiff 
stated a claim,33 not what claims he potentially could have stated. 
Nevertheless, the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained that  
 
[a] prisoner in a penal institution has no right to recover for 
the use of excessive force by prison employees unless the 
force applied was so excessive that it violated the 
prisoner’s right to be protected from the infliction of ‘cruel 
or unusual punishments’ under the state and federal 
constitutions.34  
 
This statement suggests, and subsequent cases interpret, that if a plaintiff 
can demonstrate that a state actor inflicted cruel or unusual punishment 
upon them under the constitutional standard,35 then a private right of action 
exists, notwithstanding the State’s sovereign immunity claimed under the 
OGTCA.36 It is important to note, however, that the Washington Court 
never reached the question of whether a violation of article II, section 9 of 
the Oklahoma Constitution provides a private right of action in this factual 
scenario because the cruel or unusual punishment standard was not met.37 
2. Bosh v. Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court soon had the opportunity to analyze 
whether a private right of action exists based on an Oklahoma constitutional 
violation, notwithstanding the OGTCA. The Bosh Court was presented with 
a certified question from a federal court inquiring whether article II, section 
30 of the Oklahoma Constitution,38 which guarantees Oklahomans the right 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. ¶¶ 9–18, 55 P.3d at 1039–42. 
 33. Id. ¶ 4, 55 P.3d at 1038. 
 34. Id. ¶ 10, 55 P.3d at 1039 (citing OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 9; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).  
 35. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 9. 
 36. See, e.g., Bosh v. Cherokee Cty. Governmental Bldg. Auth., 2013 OK 9, ¶¶ 17–18, 
305 P.3d 994, 1000–01; Deal v. Brooks, 2016 OK CIV APP 81, ¶ 27, 389 P.3d 375, 384 
(approved for publication by Oklahoma Supreme Court); Bryson v. Okla. Cty. ex rel. Okla. 
Cty. Det. Ctr., 2011 OK CIV APP 98, ¶ 13, 261 P.3d 627, 633. 
 37. Washington, ¶¶ 9–18, 55 P.3d at 1039–42. 
 38. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 30 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches or seizures shall not be violated; 
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to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, “provide[s] a private 
cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the 
Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act.”39 Plaintiff, a pre-incarcerated 
detainee at the Cherokee County Detention Center, was brutally attacked by 
the facility’s jailers while he was standing at a booking desk with his hands 
restrained behind his back.40 Video surveillance captured part of the attack 
and showed the jailers slamming plaintiff’s head on a desk and causing his 
fall to the floor.41 The jailers then moved plaintiff to an area outside the 
view of the video surveillance, where they continued beating him.42 This 
attack left plaintiff with extensive injuries, including a fractured vertebra, 
which the jailers left untreated for two days.43  
Plaintiff sued the jail, jail administrators, and jailers who attacked him, 
asserting claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law.44 The federal 
court later allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint to add a claim against 
the jail based on its employees’ use of excessive force under article II, 
section 30.45 The jail filed a motion to dismiss this claim, and the federal 
court looked to the Oklahoma Supreme Court for clarification regarding the 
interplay of the state constitutional provision and the OGTCA.46 
The Bosh Court held that article II, section 30 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution provides a private right of action for excessive force, 
notwithstanding the limitations of the OGTCA.47 Although it recognized 
that “the OGTCA expressly immunizes the state . . . from liability arising 
out of the operation of prison facilities,”48 the court explained that this 
immunity “does not mean that injured tort victims are at the mercy of their 
captors to be beaten, assaulted, and left without medical attention without 
any remedy to deter such conduct.”49 
                                                                                                                 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
describing as particularly as may be the place to be searched and the person or thing to be 
seized.”). 
 39. Bosh, ¶ 0, 305 P.3d at 995–96. 
 40. Id. ¶ 2, 305 P.3d at 996. 
 41. Id. ¶ 3, 305 P.3d at 996. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. ¶¶ 3–4, 305 P.3d at 996. 
 44. Id. ¶ 4, 305 P.3d at 996. 
 45. Id. ¶ 5, 305 P.3d at 997. 
 46. Id. ¶ 6, 305 P.3d at 997. 
 47. Id. ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001. 
 48. Id. ¶ 17, 305 P.3d at 1000 (citing 51 OKLA. STAT. § 155 (Supp. 2012)). 
 49. Id. ¶ 17, 305 P.3d at 1000. 
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The Bosh Court noted Washington’s holding to be “that a private cause 
of action may exist for inmates to recover for excessive force under the 
provisions of the Okla[homa] Const[itution] . . . and the 8th Amendment of 
the United States Constitution—despite the provisions of the OGTCA.”50 
Based on Washington, the Bosh Court reached the same result for article II, 
section 3051 and further emphasized that “[t]he OGTCA cannot be 
construed as immunizing the state completely from all liability for 
violations of the constitutional rights of its citizens.”52  
3. Problems from Washington and Bosh 
The state of sovereign immunity for constitutional torts in Oklahoma 
following Washington and Bosh was, in a word, muddled. Indeed, it is 
difficult to discern the state of the law based on incongruent opinions that 
provide little insight into their underlying rationales. A closer look at Bosh 
reveals that it is problematic for multiple reasons.  
First, Bosh affirmatively stated the holding in Washington as “a private 
cause of action may exist for inmates to recover for excessive force under 
the provisions of Okla. Const. art. 2, § 9 and the 8th Amendment of the 
United States Constitution—despite the provisions of the OGTCA.”53 But 
this is not accurate. The question before the Washington Court was whether 
plaintiff-inmate stated a cause of action for the use of excessive force by 
prison guards.54 The Washington Court took it upon itself to discuss a 
“potential” cause of action the plaintiff could have brought but failed to 
state.55 Even in this discussion, however, the court did not at all analyze 
how the OGTCA affects the viability of this potential cause of action. 
Again, it did not need to, as the court found that plaintiff failed to state such 
a cause of action because he did not sufficiently plead that he was subjected 
to cruel or unusual punishment.56 Thus, there is no discussion in 
Washington that a cause of action based on the use of excessive force exists 
notwithstanding the OGTCA, let alone can the assertion be considered part 
of the holding or given precedential effect. However, this “holding” appears 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. ¶ 18, 305 P.3d at 1000–01 (footnotes omitted). 
 51. Id. ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. ¶ 18, 305 P.3d at 1000–01 (footnotes omitted). 
 54. Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, ¶ 4, 55 P.3d 1036, 1038. 
 55. Id. ¶ 9, 55 P.3d at 1039. 
 56. Id. ¶¶ 9–18, 55 P.3d at 1039–42.  
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to be, in large part, the basis for Bosh’s finding that a private right of action 
exists for violations of article II, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution.57 
Second, Bosh is problematic because the method of determining when a 
private right of action exists for an Oklahoma constitutional violation 
remains unclear. Nowhere in Bosh (or Washington) does the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court state from what authority this new private right of action 
derives. Nowhere does the court explain why private rights of action exist 
for article II, sections 9 and 30, or whether any other constitutional sections 
enjoy this same private right of action. As a result, Bosh left open many 
questions, including the following: 
$ Do private rights of action based on Oklahoma constitutional 
violations exist for every constitutional provision? 
$ If not, how do courts decide which Oklahoma constitutional 
violations create private rights of action? 
$ Do these private rights of action arise out of the Oklahoma 
Constitution, or are they the product of common law? 
$ Can the Oklahoma Legislature abrogate the Bosh holding and 
extend the State’s sovereign immunity, or is it insulated due to 
the Oklahoma constitutional rights involved? 
Bosh left courts with the impossible task of understanding an opinion 
without any guidance for the proper method of prospective application. 
Bosh left citizens unsure about which violations of the Oklahoma 
Constitution, other than article II, sections 9 and 30, provide a private right 
of action. Bosh left the Oklahoma Legislature without an understanding of 
the State’s exposure to liability for violations of the Oklahoma Constitution 
or its own power to limit liability for constitutional torts. Again, the state of 
the law was muddled.  
D. The Oklahoma Legislature Strikes Back Again 
Following Washington and Bosh, the Legislature yet again heard the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court loud and clear. When Washington and Bosh were 
decided, the OGTCA did not explicitly include constitutional torts in the 
definition of “tort,” thereby exposing the State to liability for constitutional 
torts (at least in the eyes of the Oklahoma Supreme Court). In 2014, the 
Oklahoma Legislature responded to these cases by amending the OGTCA 
to specifically apply to “tort suits alleging violations of constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Bosh, ¶¶ 22–23, 305 P.3d at 1001. 
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rights.”58 Specifically, the Oklahoma Legislature amended the definition of 
“tort” to include violations of the Oklahoma Constitution: 
“Tort” means a legal wrong, independent of contract, involving 
violation of a duty imposed by general law, statute, the 
Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, or otherwise, resulting in 
a loss to any person, association or corporation as the proximate 
result of an act or omission of a political subdivision or the state 
or an employee acting within the scope of employment.59 
In addition, the Oklahoma Legislature amended the section that outlines the 
scope of the State’s tort liability, explaining that the State’s liability for 
constitutional torts is wholly governed and limited by the OGTCA.60 And in 
case a court interpreted its explicit amendment language to allow State 
liability for constitutional torts, the Oklahoma Legislature made such claims 
subject to the OGTCA’s liability limits.61 
There is no question that the Oklahoma Legislature’s intent with these 
amendments was to invoke the State’s sovereign immunity as to potential 
tort liability arising out of violations of the Oklahoma Constitution.62 What 
remained a question, however, was whether the Oklahoma Legislature had 
the authority to do so.  
The Oklahoma Constitution imposes a duty upon the Oklahoma 
Legislature to pass laws that give effect to the constitution.63 Thus, any law 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Barrios v. Haskell Cty. Pub. Facilities Auth., 2018 OK 90, ¶ 17, 432 P.3d 233, 240 
(citing 51 OKLA. STAT. §§ 152(14), 153(B) (Supp. 2015)); see Act of Apr. 21, 2014, ch. 77, 
§§ 1–2, 2014 Okla. Sess. Laws 245, 249–50 (codified at 51 OKLA. STAT. §§ 152–153 (Supp. 
2016)). 
 59. Act of Apr. 21, 2014, § 1(14), 2014 Okla. Sess. Laws at 249 (codified at 51 OKLA. 
STAT. § 152(14) (Supp. 2018)). 
 60. Id. § 2, 2014 Okla. Sess. Laws at 250 (codified at 51 OKLA. STAT. § 153(B) (Supp. 
2018)) (“The liability of the state or political subdivision under The Governmental Tort 
Claims Act shall be exclusive and shall constitute the extent of tort liability of the state, a 
political subdivision or employee arising from common law, statute, the Oklahoma 
Constitution, or otherwise.”). 
 61. Id. (“If a court of competent jurisdiction finds tort liability on the part of the state or 
a political subdivision of the state based on a provision of the Oklahoma Constitution or 
state law other than The Governmental Tort Claims Act, the limits of liability provided for in 
The Governmental Tort Claims Act shall apply.”). 
 62. Barrios, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d at 239–40. 
 63. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 45 (“The Legislature shall pass such laws as are necessary 
for carrying into effect the provisions of this Constitution.”). 
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contrary to the Oklahoma Constitution violates the Legislature’s duty.64 If 
the constitution itself creates a private right of action based in tort for 
violations of its provisions, then the Oklahoma Legislature has no authority 
to limit recovery as it attempted to do via the OGTCA. If, instead, the 
common law creates such a private right of action, then the Oklahoma 
Legislature’s expression of sovereign immunity as to torts arising from 
violations of the Oklahoma Constitution is valid and within its authority.  
E. Cases After the OGTCA Amendments, but Governed by Prior OGTCA 
Versions: Still No Help 
1. Perry v. City of Norman 
Shortly after the OGTCA amendments went into effect in April 2014, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court confronted another tort case based on a city 
police officer’s use of excessive force and governed by pre-amendment 
versions of the OGTCA. In Perry v. City of Norman,65 plaintiff and a few of 
his friends rode their bikes to attend the Norman Music Festival.66 On their 
way home, the group was stopped by a police officer who began issuing 
citations to plaintiff’s friends for running a stop sign.67 The police officer 
asked plaintiff “if he was interfering with the traffic stop,” to which he 
replied in the negative.68 Abruptly thereafter, the police officer put plaintiff 
in a chokehold.69 More officers arrived and forced plaintiff onto his 
stomach with their knees and elbows, although Perry was not resisting 
                                                                                                                 
 64. EOG Res. Mktg., Inc. v. Okla. State Bd. of Equalization, 2008 OK 95, ¶ 16, 196 
P.3d 511, 520 (“The [Oklahoma] Constitution is the bulwark to which all [State] statutes 
must yield.”) (citing S. Tulsa Citizens Coal., L.L.C. v. Ark. River Bridge Auth., 2008 OK 4, 
¶ 11, 176 P.3d 1217, 1220; In re Assessments for Year 2005 of Certain Real Prop. Owned 
by Askins Props., L.L.C., 2007 OK 25, ¶ 12, 161 P.3d 303, 311; Okla. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. 
Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 1999 OK 35, ¶ 7, 982 P.2d 512, 514; Reherman v. Okla. Water Res. 
Bd., 1984 OK 12, ¶ 22, 679 P.2d 1296, 1302).  
 65. 2014 OK 119, 341 P.3d 689. In Perry, the Oklahoma Supreme Court analyzes the 
2011 and 2012 versions of the OGTCA. This is appropriate because the alleged 
constitutional violation occurred in 2013, when those versions of the OGTCA were in effect. 
The statutory language amendments discussed in Section I.D were not controlling in this 
case, so the version of the OGTCA in effect for purposes of the Perry opinion is not 
significant. 
 66. Id. ¶ 2, 341 P.3d at 689.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. ¶ 3, 341 P.3d at 690.  
 69. Id.  
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arrest nor guilty of a crime.70 Plaintiff suffered a severe bone fracture and 
eventually lost consciousness.71  
Following this callous encounter, plaintiff sued the City of Norman for 
its police officers’ actions.72 He brought a Bosh claim,73 alleging that the 
police officers acted with the intent to use excessive force against him in 
violation of article II, section 30.74  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected plaintiff’s claim, holding that a 
“claim for excessive force against a municipality, as applied to police 
officers and other law enforcement personnel, may not be brought against a 
municipality when a cause of action under the OGTCA is available.”75 
Accordingly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained that the 
distinguishing fact between the Bosh plaintiff and the Perry plaintiff “is that 
the Bosh plaintiff was barred from bringing an action under the provisions 
of the OGTCA, and the [Perry] plaintiff . . . is not.”76 
Unfortunately for other judges, citizens, and the Oklahoma Legislature 
alike, Perry did not help un-muddle the state of sovereign immunity in 
Oklahoma. According to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, a private right of 
action for a violation of the Oklahoma Constitution seemed to only be 
available if no other remedy exists.77 Indeed, the court referenced Bosh 
again when it noted that “without the excessive force action brought under 
the Oklahoma Constitution, the Bosh plaintiff would have had no avenue 
for recovery for his injuries whatsoever.”78 Yet this assertion is not 
technically accurate. The Oklahoma Supreme Court permits suits for 
prospective injunctive relief against a state actor in their individual capacity 
for Oklahoma constitutional violations—a remedy available to plaintiffs in 
all constitutional tort cases, including Bosh.79 Thus, although the Perry 
Court attempted to offer some guidance as to when a private right of action 
for constitutional torts exists, its reasoning was demonstrably flawed, 
moving the current jurisprudence from the realm of no rationale, to an 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. ¶ 4, 341 P.3d at 690. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. ¶ 5, 341 P.3d at 690. 
 73. Following Bosh, the term “Bosh claim” has been used to describe private rights of 
action for tort damages based on alleged violations of the Oklahoma Constitution. E.g., id. ¶ 
7, 341 P.3d at 690. 
 74. Id. ¶ 5, 341 P.3d at 690. 
 75. Id. ¶ 1, 341 P.3d at 689. 
 76. Id. ¶ 17, 341 P.3d at 692. 
 77. See id. ¶ 19, 341 P.3d at 693.  
 78. Id. ¶ 18, 341 P.3d at 692–93. 
 79. See, e.g., Hunsucker v. Fallin, 2017 OK 100, ¶ 7, 408 P.3d 599, 603. 
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erroneous rationale. Moreover, following Perry, it remained unclear 
whether Bosh claims arise from the Oklahoma Constitution or the common 
law.  
2. Deal v. Brooks 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court confronted another constitutional tort 
case that implicated the OGTCA in 2016—again governed by a pre-
amendment version of the OGTCA.80 This time, the alleged tort was based 
on the Oklahoma Department of Human Services’ (DHS) violation of a 
child’s due process rights. In Deal v. Brooks, the state placed a child in 
DHS custody with her biological father, who later murdered her.81 The 
child’s maternal grandparents brought several claims on behalf of the 
child’s estate, including various claims under tort theories of liability 
against DHS itself and the DHS employees involved.82  
DHS argued that the OGTCA exempted it from liability since the act 
proclaims that “[t]he state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a 
loss or claim results from . . . [a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of 
an employee in the placement of children.”83 The Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals, and later the Oklahoma Supreme Court by approving Deal for 
publication,84 agreed with DHS, finding that “the plain and ordinary 
meaning of [§] 155(29) requires that [it] find [that] a cause of action” is 
unavailable under the OGTCA.85 
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals continued its analysis by 
addressing whether a Bosh claim was nonetheless available since a remedy 
for the actions of DHS was unavailable under the OGTCA.86 The 
constitutional right at issue was the child’s substantive due process right “to 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Deal v. Brooks, 2016 OK CIV APP 81, 389 P.3d 375 (approved for publication by 
Oklahoma Supreme Court). In Deal, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, and Oklahoma 
Supreme Court by its approval, appropriately analyzed the 2013 version of the OGTCA. The 
alleged constitutional violation occurred in 2013, when the 2013 version of the OGTCA was 
in effect. The statutory language amendments discussed in Section I.D were not controlling 
in this case, so the version of the OGTCA in effect for purposes of the Deal opinion is not 
significant.  
 81. Id. ¶ 6, 389 P.3d at 380. 
 82. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8–10, 389 P.3d at 380. 
 83. Id. ¶ 2, 389 P.3d at 379 (quoting 51 OKLA. STAT. §§ 155, 155(29) (Supp. 2013)). 
 84. Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals opinions approved for publication in the official 
reporter by a majority of the Oklahoma Supreme Court are precedential, just like an opinion 
authored and published by the Oklahoma Supreme Court itself. See 20 OKLA. STAT. § 30.5 
(2011); Oklahoma Supreme Court Rule 1.200(d).  
 85. Deal, ¶ 24, 389 P.3d at 383. 
 86. Id. ¶ 25, 389 P.3d at 383. 
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be reasonably safe from harm when placed in the state’s custody.”87 The 
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the Oklahoma due process 
clause supersedes the OGTCA for “placement decisions that are made 
recklessly in conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk of serious, 
immediate, and proximate harm to the child.”88 As a result, “the [O]GTCA 
does not immunize DHS from liability for certain reckless and deliberate 
acts that deprive a child of due process rights while in state custody.”89 
Thus, another decision approved by the Oklahoma Supreme Court found 
the State liable for a constitutional tort even though the terms of the 
OGTCA granted the State sovereign immunity.  
Up to the time of Deal, and into most of 2018, the true origin of Bosh 
claims remained in question: Do they arise from the Oklahoma Constitution 
directly, or are they merely an exercise of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s 
common law power? If the former, then any attempt by the Oklahoma 
Legislature to limit or extinguish liability is futile. If the latter, then the 
Oklahoma Legislature has every right to limit liability as to these claims.  
However, the amendments to the OGTCA explicitly invoking the State’s 
sovereign immunity as to constitutional torts were not yet in full force and 
effect when Perry and Deal were issued. Further, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court did not indicate how the 2014 amendments would have impacted 
these rulings, or how they may impact future rulings. In fact, in Deal, the 
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals ducked the issue altogether by 
acknowledging that even though the 2014 OGTCA Amendments “may 
constitute an attempt by the Legislature to diminish or destroy 
constitutionally-based causes of action against the state or political 
subdivision,”90 it did not need to consider injuries and filings from 2013, 
which occurred prior to the effective date of the 2014 OGTCA 
amendments. Consequently, while these cases were issued after the 2014 
OGTCA Amendments, they did nothing to shed light on the origin of Bosh 
claims.  
Even though the Oklahoma Supreme Court was not applying the version 
of the OGTCA that defined “tort” to include those arising from violations 
of the Oklahoma Constitution, it still applied versions that were arguably as 
broad. Thus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s repeated finding or approval 
of a private right of action for violations of the Oklahoma Constitution, 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id. ¶ 28, 389 P.3d at 384 (quoting GJA v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 OK 
CIV APP 32, ¶ 37, 347 P.3d 310, 317).  
 88. Id. ¶ 55, 389 P.3d at 391–92. 
 89. Id. ¶ 29, 389 P.3d at 384. 
 90. Id. ¶ 29 n.5, 389 P.3d at 383 n.5. 
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notwithstanding any version of the OGTCA, implies that it viewed Bosh 
claims as arising from the Oklahoma Constitution itself, although neither 
Bosh, Perry, nor Deal explicitly say as much. 
In Perry, the only reason that the Oklahoma Supreme Court offered to 
suggest that a Bosh claim was not a recovery option for the plaintiff was 
because he already had a remedy available under the OGTCA.91 If a remedy 
were not available under the OGTCA, then the court probably would have 
found that, like the plaintiff in Bosh, a private right of action based on the 
municipality’s use of excessive force in violation of the Oklahoma 
Constitution would have been available.92 The court’s reasoning—flawed as 
it may be—supports the notion that it viewed Bosh claims as arising from 
the Oklahoma Constitution, because such claims would exist regardless of 
whether the OGTCA existed. 
In Deal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court approved of the finding that, 
notwithstanding a provision of the OGTCA explicitly immunizing the State 
from liability in the factual situation presented, the plaintiffs had a private 
right of action in tort for the violation of the child’s due process rights.93 
Again, while Deal does not explicitly say that Bosh claims arise from the 
Oklahoma Constitution, it clearly recognizes a private right of action that 
directly contradicts the Legislature’s mandate that the State is immune from 
tort liability. Although not glaringly apparent, these cases reveal that, at this 
time, the Oklahoma Supreme Court viewed the Oklahoma Constitution as 
the source of Bosh claims, not common law. 
II. Clarity from the Court: Barrios 
For the first time in decades, the Oklahoma Supreme Court provided 
clarity as to the true nature of Bosh claims when it answered a certified 
question from two federal courts in Barrios v. Haskell County Public 
Facilities Authority94 and Foutch v. Turn Key Health.95 The Northern and 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Perry v. City of Norman, 2014 OK 119, ¶ 19, 341 P.3d 689, 693. Again, note that 
this assertion by the Oklahoma Supreme Court is inaccurate. See, e.g., Hunsucker v. Fallin, 
2017 OK 100, ¶ 7, 408 P.3d 599, 603 (demonstrating the availability of private rights of 
action for prospective injunctive relief against a state actor in their individual capacity for 
Oklahoma constitutional violations). It is nevertheless the reasoning employed by the court. 
 92. See Perry, ¶¶ 18–19, 341 P.3d at 692–93. 
 93. Deal, ¶¶ 55–56, 389 P.3d at 391–92. 
 94. 2018 OK 90, 432 P.3d 233.  
 95. Id. As the Oklahoma Supreme Court was asked to address the same question from 
two separate federal district courts, the court made them companion cases and only crafted 
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Eastern District Courts of Oklahoma asked the Oklahoma Supreme Court to 
answer the following question: 
The Governmental Tort Claims Act renders the State immune 
from any tort suit arising out of the “[p]rovision, equipping, 
operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional 
facility.” Do Sections 7 and 9 of Article II of the Oklahoma 
Constitution nonetheless allow an inmate to bring a tort claim for 
denial of medical care?96 
Barrios placed the issue of sovereign immunity for constitutional torts 
directly before the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The cases underlying Barrios 
involved inmates who died while incarcerated at county prisons.97 Randall 
Barrios committed suicide,98 and Russell Foutch died from respiratory 
complications.99 Each of the decedents’ estates brought claims against the 
respective jails and state actors involved, including “tort claims alleging 
violations of rights guaranteed by sections 7 and 9 of article II of the 
Oklahoma Constitution.”100 The state actors moved to dismiss these claims, 
arguing that the OGTCA immunized them from liability.101 No one 
contested that the alleged constitutional torts fit within section 155 of the 
OGTCA, in which the Oklahoma Legislature attempted to invoke the 
State’s sovereign immunity for suits arising out of the “[p]rovision, 
equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional 
facility.”102 Because these cases turned on whether private rights of action 
existed for constitutional torts, notwithstanding the OGTCA limits, the 
federal courts accordingly looked to the Oklahoma Supreme Court for 
guidance. 
A. The Holding: The Death Knell of Bosh Claims  
The Barrios Court found that because the OGTCA invokes the State’s 
sovereign immunity for constitutional torts arising out of the “[p]rovision, 
                                                                                                                 
one opinion. Both case stylings are listed in the opinion but will be referred to only as 
Barrios for the purpose of this Article.  
 96. Id. ¶ 1, 432 P.3d at 235 (quoting 51 OKLA. STAT. § 155(25) (Supp. 2018)). The 
federal courts also asked whether such a private right of action could be recognized 
retrospectively, but this question became moot and was therefore not addressed. Id. 
 97. Id. ¶ 3, 432 P.3d at 235. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (citing the respective complaints). 
 101. Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 432 P.3d at 235–36. 
 102. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 155(25) (Supp. 2018). 
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equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison, jail or correctional 
facility,”103 an inmate cannot bring a constitutional tort claim for denial of 
medical care.104 In doing so, the Oklahoma Supreme Court put a stop to the 
expansion of Bosh claims by eliminating the private right of action to 
recover money damages for constitutional torts.  
To reach this conclusion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s reasoning was 
twofold. First, the court clarified that the previously approved private rights 
of action for constitutional torts were products of common law.105 In its 
discussion of Bosh, the court stated that it “recognized a common law tort 
remedy for claims arising from alleged violations of Article II, Section 30 
rights.”106 To be even clearer, the Oklahoma Supreme Court added that “the 
cause of action we recognized [in Bosh] was not one created by the 
Oklahoma Constitution, but rather by the [Oklahoma Supreme] Court 
through its common law power to create a cause of action for the alleged 
deprivation of a constitutional right.”107 
Second, the court explained that the Legislature’s amendment of the 
OGTCA to include constitutional torts “forecloses [the court’s] ability to 
expand the common law in a manner that would conflict with statutory 
law.”108 This legislative action was described as “an exercise of the 
Legislature’s long-recognized power to define the scope of the State’s 
sovereign immunity.”109 
B. The SCOTUS Parallel 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not stop there. It went on to assert that 
even if the relevant constitutional tort claims were not barred by the 
OGTCA, it is unlikely that a private right of action would exist at common 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. 
 104. Barrios, ¶ 18, 432 P.3d at 241. 
 105. Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 432 P.3d at 239–40. Again, whether a private right of action can exist 
for a violation of the Oklahoma Constitution largely depends upon whether the action 
derives from the Oklahoma Constitution itself (which the Oklahoma Legislature cannot 
abrogate), or instead from the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s common law power (which the 
Oklahoma Legislature can abrogate). See id. ¶ 8–9, 432 P.3d at 237–38; see also id. ¶ 9 n.14, 
432 P.3d at 238 n.14 (discussing that “Article II, Section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution” 
does not provide a cause of action, but the right was created “through [the court’s] common 
law power to create a cause of action”). 
 106. Id. ¶ 9, 432 P.3d at 238 (emphasis added).  
 107. Id. ¶ 9 n.14, 432 P.3d at 238 n.14 (citing Bosh v. Cherokee Cty. Governmental 
Bldg. Auth., 2013 OK 9, ¶ 8, 305 P.3d 994, 997). 
 108. Id. ¶ 12, 432 P.3d at 238 (citing Fuller v. Odom, 1987 OK 64, ¶¶ 4–5, 741 P.2d 449, 
451–52).  
 109. Id. ¶ 12, 432 P.3d at 238. 
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law.110 In support of this assessment, the Oklahoma Supreme Court looked 
to the Supreme Court of the United States’ (SCOTUS) jurisprudence 
regarding the federal analogue of Bosh claims: Bivens claims.111  
In Bivens, SCOTUS recognized an implied right of action that allows 
individuals to sue federal employees for violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.112 Bivens was decided almost five decades ago, and since that 
time, SCOTUS has only recognized two more implied rights of action.113 
This evidences SCOTUS’s reluctance to extend Bivens claims “to any new 
context or new category of defendants.”114 
In Barrios, the Oklahoma Supreme Court took note of a recent SCOTUS 
case that cast doubt on the continuing viability and expansion of Bivens 
claims, Ziglar v. Abbasi.115 The Oklahoma Supreme Court discussed Ziglar 
v. Abbasi, noting that SCOTUS “declined to recognize a tort claim brought 
by detainees who alleged they were abused in violation of their Due Process 
Rights.”116 The Oklahoma Supreme Court further observed that in Ziglar, 
SCOTUS “called the continuing validity of Carlson,” which provided for 
an implied damages remedy for an Eighth Amendment violation, “into 
grave doubt, saying that it might decide the case differently today because 
‘the arguments for recognizing implied causes of action for damages’ had 
‘los[t] their force.’”117  
Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted SCOTUS’s contention that 
“[w]hen a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under the [United 
States] Constitution itself, . . . separation-of-powers principles are or should 
be central to the analysis . . . [and t]he question is ‘who should decide’ 
whether to provide for a damages remedy, [the Legislature] or the 
courts?”118 The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed that “‘[t]he answer most 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. ¶ 13, 432 P.3d at 239. 
 111. Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971), with Barrios, ¶¶ 14–17, 432 P.3d at 239–40. 
 112. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–90, 395. 
 113. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980) (implied right of action recognized 
based on Eighth Amendment Due Process clause); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 
(1979) (implied right of action recognized based on Fifth Amendment Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment clause). 
 114. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Barrios v. Haskell Cty. Pub. Facilities Auth., 2018 OK 90, ¶ 14, 432 P.3d 233, 239. 
 117. Id. ¶ 14, 432 P.3d at 239–40 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 
1856).  
 118. Id. ¶ 16, 432 P.3d at 240 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1857).  
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often will be’ the Legislature, because ‘[w]hen an issue involves a host of 
considerations that must be weighed and appraised,’ it should be committed 
to ‘those who write the laws’ rather than ‘those who interpret them.’”119  
C. What We Know Now 
1. How the Oklahoma Supreme Court Views Washington and Bosh 
Any understanding of Washington and Bosh to allow for private rights of 
action for constitutional torts is eradicated following Barrios. The Barrios 
Court explained that it did not hold in Washington that a private right of 
action for an alleged constitutional violation exists.120 Instead, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court “assumed for purposes of [its] decision that 
Article II, Section 9 creates a cause of action for an inmate to bring a tort 
claim alleging violations of his or her right to be free from cruel or unusual 
punishments.”121 But, the court stated that it has never recognized such a 
claim because the inmate in Washington failed to plead it.122 Thus, 
Washington does not represent the court’s approval of a private right of 
action for constitutional torts. 
When it decided Bosh, it is clear that the court believed that “[t]he text of 
the [O]GTCA certainly didn’t expressly include tort claims arising from 
alleged deprivations of constitutional rights.”123 And because “[i]mmunity 
cannot be read into a legislative text that is silent, doubtful or 
ambiguous,”124 the Bosh Court “recognized a common law tort remedy for 
claims arising from alleged violations of Article II, Section 30 rights.”125 
Since it was a common law remedy, and the Legislature subsequently 
amended the OGTCA to specify that it invokes sovereign immunity for 
constitutional torts, the Barrios Court did not find a new Bosh claim. Bosh, 
like Washington, does not represent the court’s approval of a private right 
of action for constitutional torts. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 119. Id. ¶ 17, 432 P.3d at 240 (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1857). 
 120. Id. ¶ 13, 432 P.3d at 239 (citing Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, ¶ 18, 55 P.3d 
1036, 1041–42). 
 121. Id. (citing Washington, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d at 1039). 
 122. Id. (citing Washington, ¶ 18, 55 P.3d at 1041–42). 
 123. Id. ¶ 9, 432 P.3d at 237. 
 124. Id. ¶ 9, 432 P.3d at 237 (quoting Gunn v. Consol. Rural Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1, 
1992 OK 131, ¶ 7, 839 P.2d 1345, 1349).  
 125. Id. ¶ 9, 432 P.3d at 238. 
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2. The Flip-Flopping Oklahoma Supreme Court? 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s current view of Washington and Bosh is 
plain from Barrios. Upon a review of the legislative history of the OGTCA, 
as well as cases decided following the 2014 OGTCA amendments, 
however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court appears to be flip-flopping.  
The controlling version of the OGTCA in Bosh, Perry, and Deal defined 
“tort” in the following way: 
a legal wrong, independent of contract, involving violation of a 
duty imposed by general law or otherwise, resulting in a loss to 
any person, association or corporation as the proximate result of 
an act or omission of a political subdivision or the state or an 
employee acting within the scope of employment.126  
It is hard to argue that the Oklahoma Supreme Court could read this 
definition as anything but all-encompassing. It is even harder to argue that 
this definition excludes constitutional torts. After all, torts arising from 
violations of the Oklahoma Constitution check all the statutory boxes: legal 
wrongs, independent of contract, involving a duty imposed by the 
Oklahoma Constitution. Unfortunately, the lack of rationale on this point 
contained in Bosh, Perry, and Deal make it difficult to determine whether 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court is flip-flopping here, or whether it really did 
read the pre-2014 version of the OGTCA as excluding immunity for 
constitutional torts. 
This argument is even more difficult to make in light of Perry and Deal, 
both of which were decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court after the 
Legislature enacted the 2014 OGTCA amendments to expressly include 
constitutional torts. Perry implied that the defendant would have had a 
private right of action for a constitutional tort, notwithstanding the OGTCA 
version with a broad definition of “tort,” if he had no other remedy.127 
Absent from Perry, however, is any discussion of the effect that the 
inclusion of constitutional torts into the OGTCA (per the 2014 OGTCA 
Amendments) would have on the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s analysis. Any 
such discussion would be dicta, but the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not 
even signal that it was aware of the 2014 OGTCA Amendments in effect at 
the time this opinion was issued, nor did the court explain how the 
amendments would impact future cases. Even so, the most logical 
explanation for the court’s decision in Perry is that it viewed Bosh claims 
                                                                                                                 
 126. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 152(14) (2011) (amended 2014). 
 127. See Perry v. City of Norman, 2014 OK 119, ¶ 11, 341 P.3d 689, 691. 
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as arising from the Oklahoma Constitution itself—as the broad definition of 
“tort” was controlling. 
This conclusion was reaffirmed with the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s 
approval of Deal, which found that even though the State would enjoy 
sovereign immunity by the terms of the OGTCA, the State was still liable 
for constitutional torts.128 Again, this was so even though the OGTCA 
broadly defined “tort” and specifically invoked sovereign immunity as to 
the injuries presented. 
For the Oklahoma Supreme Court to claim that Barrios is simply a 
response to the 2014 OGTCA Amendments does not provide a complete 
picture of its jurisprudence. It decided Bosh, Perry, and Deal by applying 
versions of the OGTCA that provided an arguably all-encompassing 
definition of “tort,” which in all likelihood the Oklahoma Legislature 
intended to be inclusive of torts arising from violations of the Oklahoma 
Constitution. In Deal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court approved of the 
holding that “Oklahoma’s due process clause prevails over the 
[O]GTCA”129 even though the OGTCA precluded recovery against the 
State. As evidenced by Bosh, Perry, and Deal, the court viewed Bosh 
claims as a product of the Oklahoma Constitution, which was consistent 
with its holdings that private rights of action exist.  
The Oklahoma Legislature adopted the 2014 OGTCA Amendments to 
specifically define “tort” as arising from “the Constitution of the State of 
Oklahoma.”130 Later, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reconciled its prior 
holdings in Barrios by asserting that “[i]mmunity cannot be read into a 
legislative text that is silent, doubtful or ambiguous.”131 Because the 
OGTCA’s pre-2014 definition of “tort” was sweepingly broad, it is hard to 
imagine how its breadth can be construed as “silent, doubtful, or 
ambiguous.” This is exactly how the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Barrios 
maintains it interpreted the prior version of the statute before the 2014 
Amendments became effective. Now, according to the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, any silence, doubt, or ambiguity contained in the OGTCA is 
supposedly resolved by the 2014 OGTCA Amendments. That’s the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s story and it’s sticking to it.  
                                                                                                                 
 128. See Deal v. Brooks, 2016 OK CIV APP 81, ¶ 56, 389 P.3d 375, 392 (approved for 
publication by Oklahoma Supreme Court).  
 129. Id. ¶ 55, 389 P.3d at 391. 
 130. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 152(14) (Supp. 2018). 
 131. Barrios v. Haskell Cty. Pub. Facilities Auth., 2018 OK 90, ¶ 9, 432 P.3d 233, 237 
(quoting Gunn v. Consol. Rural Water & Sewer Dist. No. 1, 1992 OK 131, ¶ 7, 839 P.2d 
1345, 1349).  
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3. The Death Knell of Bosh Claims (If the Oklahoma Legislature Says 
So) 
A theme woven throughout the entire Barrios opinion is that the 
Legislature possesses authority to determine the remedy for torts arising 
from violations of the Oklahoma Constitution. Prior precedent implies that 
the court viewed private rights of action as deriving from the Oklahoma 
Constitution, which prevents the Legislature from abrogating them.132 The 
Barrios Court, however, explicitly held otherwise.133 As a result, the court’s 
most recent precedent recognizes the Legislature’s power to abrogate these 
“common law” private rights of action. 
4. The Death Knell of Bosh Claims May Ring Even If the Legislature 
Doesn’t Say So 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court took it a step further by expressing 
reservations about the existence of private rights of action arising from 
violations of article II, sections 7 and 9, even if the OGTCA did not bar 
such claims.134 Although this discussion is dicta, it is clearly indicative of 
the majority’s frame of mind. It calls into question the validity of all Bosh 
claims recognized to date, both because of the 2014 OGTCA Amendments 
and the fact that courts disfavor awarding implied damages for 
constitutional violations.135 Thus, even if the Legislature did not invoke 
sovereign immunity for constitutional torts, Barrios suggests that the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court likely would not expand Bosh claims via its 
common law power, and may even abstain from permitting those Bosh 
claims it has already recognized. 
5. The Current State of the Law 
After Barrios, sovereign immunity’s interplay with constitutional torts in 
Oklahoma is as clear as it has been in decades. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court is no longer withholding its rationale or resting on entirely unsound 
                                                                                                                 
 132. See, e.g., Deal, ¶ 55, 389 P.3d at 391–92 (“Oklahoma’s due process clause prevails 
over the [O]GTCA . . . .”); Perry v. City of Norman, 2014 OK 119, ¶ 20, 341 P.3d 689, 693 
(“The OGTCA cannot be construed as immunizing the state completely from all liability for 
violations of the constitutional rights of its citizens.”).  
 133. Barrios, ¶ 17, 432 P.3d at 240 (“[W]e conclude that the [O]GTCA’s specific 
prohibition against tort suits [alleging violations of constitutional rights] . . . is a legislative 
determination to which we must now defer.”). 
 134. Id. ¶ 13, 432 P.3d at 239. 
 135. Id. ¶ 16, 432 P.3d at 240; see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). 
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reasoning. The unanswered questions that left courts, citizens, and the 
Oklahoma Legislature guessing can now be answered:  
$ Do private rights of action exist for violations of every 
Oklahoma constitutional provision? No. 
$ If not, how will courts decide which Oklahoma constitutional 
violations create private rights of action? The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court is unlikely to expand Bosh claims because the 
Oklahoma Legislature has clearly addressed sovereign immunity 
for constitutional torts. 
$ Do these private rights of action arise from the Oklahoma 
Constitution, or are they the product of common law? These 
private rights of action are the product of common law. 
$ Can the Oklahoma Legislature abrogate Bosh to extend the 
State’s sovereign immunity, or is it insulated due to the 
Oklahoma constitutional rights involved? Yes, the Oklahoma 
Legislature can abrogate the Bosh holding and extend the 
State’s sovereign immunity. It validly did so in the 2014 OGTCA 
Amendments. 
III. Is This the Right Result? Technically, Yes. Realistically, No 
A. Technically the Right Result 
Until Barrios was decided, it was difficult to discern whether a private 
right of action existed for constitutional torts. Now it is clear that 
constitutional torts create no right of action because of the Oklahoma 
Legislature’s pronouncement of sovereign immunity within the OGTCA. 
This was the right result for four reasons: (1) it is consistent with the 
Supremacy Clause; (2) it is consistent with the policy concerns underlying 
the OGTCA; (3) it is consistent with the Oklahoma Legislature’s role in 
determining the State’s fiscal policy; and (4) it is consistent with the 
Oklahoma Constitution.  
1. The Supremacy Clause 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the Oklahoma Legislature’s 
enactment of it via the OGTCA, does not offend the Supremacy Clause. 
Critics of sovereign immunity argue that allowing sovereigns to only be 
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sued with their consent is inconsistent with the United States Constitution, 
including the Supremacy Clause.136 Article VI, however, reads as follows: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.137 
Critics assert that sovereign immunity offends the Supremacy Clause by 
allowing a common law doctrine to trump the Constitution.138 Their sole 
supporting argument that constitutional rights are frustrated and without 
remedy due to sovereign immunity139 is, however, without merit.  
Federal and state constitutional rights can be vindicated via recognized 
and established remedies notwithstanding the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. When federal constitutional rights are violated, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
and Ex parte Young actions provide relief. Section 1983 provides citizens a 
private right of action for the deprivation of their federal constitutional 
rights by a state actor.140 Similar to § 1983 claims, Ex parte Young actions 
also provide citizens a private right of action for the deprivation of their 
federal constitutional rights by a state actor and may give rise to prospective 
injunctive relief.141 When state constitutional rights are violated, both § 
1983 and Ex parte Young actions can provide relief if the relevant state 
constitutional provision tracks a federal constitutional provision in text and 
interpretation. In addition, Oklahoma courts recognize suits for prospective 
injunctive relief against state actors in their individual capacities to prevent 
ongoing violations of the Oklahoma Constitution.142  
While the doctrine of sovereign immunity could offend the United States 
and Oklahoma Constitutions if it resulted in a laundry list of rights without 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 
1211–12 (2001). 
 137. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 138. See Chemerinsky, supra note 136, at 1211.  
 139. Id. at 1211–12. 
 140. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see Haines v. Fisher, 82 F.3d 1503, 1508 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(“The obvious purpose of . . . § 1983 was to provide a remedy to parties deprived of 
constitutional rights by a state official’s abuse of his position while acting under color of 
state law.”) (quoting D.T. ex rel. M.T. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1187 
(10th Cir. 1990)).  
 141. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). 
 142. See, e.g., Hunsucker v. Fallin, 2017 OK 100, ¶¶ 3–7, 408 P.3d 599, 601–03. 
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remedies,143 this is not the case. Under the current state of sovereign 
immunity, constitutional rights can still be vindicated because the doctrine 
only works to shape the remedy available for a violation of these rights. 
Therefore, the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not offend the 
Supremacy Clause. 
2. OGTCA Policy Concerns 
The Barrios holding is consistent with the policy concerns underlying 
the Oklahoma Legislature’s enactment of the OGTCA. Sovereign immunity 
is not something the State has to forgo, as it has long been recognized as an 
inherent power. The Oklahoma Legislature created the OGTCA and the 
waivers of sovereign immunity therein in an effort to level the playing field 
between state and private actors.144 In doing so, the Legislature sought to 
ensure that the State could be sued to the same extent that a private party 
could be sued for certain torts. To illustrate, if a person gets rear-ended on 
the highway, shouldn’t they be able to recover in tort from the driver, 
regardless of whether the driver is a private citizen or government 
employee? It clashes with one’s internal sense of fairness to say that the 
government does not have to compensate an injured person for damages 
caused by one of its employees when a right of action against a private 
citizen would otherwise exist. 
But when it comes to constitutional torts, there is no such thing as a right 
of action against a private citizen. Even if a private citizen inflicted what 
would amount to cruel or unusual punishment under article 2, section 9 of 
the Oklahoma Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution would not be 
violated. This is because constitutional rights only limit government action. 
There is therefore no playing field to level, and no resulting inequity in 
disallowing suits for money damages against the State.  
3. Fiscal Policy 
This outcome is also consistent with the Oklahoma “Legislature’s 
exclusive power to [declare] the State’s fiscal policy.”145 “A decision as to 
whether to allow tort suits is . . . a decision as to whether the People’s tax 
dollars should be used to pay money damages to those who successfully sue 
the state . . . .”146 Thus, invoking sovereign immunity as to some torts, 
                                                                                                                 
 143. See Perry v. City of Norman, 2014 OK 119, ¶ 20, 341 P.3d 689, 693.  
 144. See Vanderpool v. State, 1983 OK 82, ¶¶ 8–14, 672 P.2d 1153, 1154–55. 
 145. Barrios v. Haskell Cty. Pub. Facilities Auth., 2018 OK 90, ¶ 7, 432 P.3d 233, 237. 
 146. Id.; see also id. ¶ 7 n.9, 432 P.3d at 237 n.9 (“As a matter of fundamental law, the 
fiscal policy of this state is determined by the legislative department of government.”) 
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while waiving it for others, is functionally a fiscal decision within 
understood powers of the Oklahoma Legislature.  
4. Sovereign Immunity Via the OGTCA Is Not Trumped by the Oklahoma 
Constitution 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has long recognized that “[t]he 
[Oklahoma] Constitution is the bulwark to which all [State] statutes must 
yield.”147 Thus, if the doctrine of sovereign immunity conflicts with the 
Oklahoma Constitution, then any legislative action that invokes sovereign 
immunity is without force. As the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized in 
Barrios, the doctrine does not conflict with the Oklahoma Constitution for 
two reasons.  
First, the drafters left the remedies for Oklahoma constitutional 
violations to be determined by the Oklahoma Legislature. The Oklahoma 
Constitution outlines various rights guaranteed to Oklahomans in article II: 
the Oklahoma Bill of Rights. It also guarantees that a “speedy and certain 
remedy [shall be] afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, 
property, or reputation.”148 While it is unquestionable that a violation of an 
article II right constitutes a wrong or injury,149 the Oklahoma Constitution 
is silent as to remedy available for a violation of these rights. The 
Oklahoma Constitution is clear, however, about the power vested in the 
Oklahoma Legislature. It extends to all “rightful subjects of legislation,” 
which cannot be restricted, limited, or excluded by a constitutional grant of 
                                                                                                                 
(quoting In re Application of Okla. Capital Improvement Auth., 1998 OK 25, ¶ 5, 958 P.2d 
759, 762); Calvey v. Daxon, 2000 OK 17, ¶ 21, 997 P.2d 164, 171–72 (“Except where it 
encounters a specific constitutional prohibition, the Legislature has the right and the 
responsibility to declare the fiscal policy of Oklahoma. This Court has no authority to 
consider the desirability, wisdom, or practicability of fiscal legislation. . . . Whether an act is 
wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory or whether it is the best means 
to achieve the desired result are matters for legislative determination.”) (footnote omitted). 
 147. EOG Res. Mktg., Inc. v. Okla. State Bd. Of Equalization, 2008 OK 95, ¶ 16, 196 
P.3d 511, 520 (citing S. Tulsa Citizens Coal., L.L.C. v. Ark. River Bridge Auth., 2008 OK 4, 
¶ 11, 176 P.3d 1217, 1220; In re Assessments for Year 2005 of Certain Real Prop. Owned 
by Askins Props., L.L.C., 2007 OK 25, ¶ 12, 161 P.3d 303, 311; Okla. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. 
Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 1999 OK 35, ¶ 7, 982 P.2d 512, 514; Reherman v. Okla. Water Res. 
Bd., 1984 OK 12, ¶ 22, 679 P.2d 1296, 1302).  
 148. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6; see also Nash v. Baker, 1974 OK CIV APP 19, ¶ 8, 522 
P.2d 1335, 1338 (“This section does not promise a remedy to every complainant, not even to 
every complainant who suffers financial loss or disadvantage or disappointment, but only to 
such as have suffered a ‘legal wrong.’”). 
 149. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6. 
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authority.150 Oklahoma courts have commented on this grant of power, 
observing “the legislature of the state of Oklahoma is constitutionally 
vested with the power and authority to pass legislation on any subject not 
withheld by the Constitution of this State or the Federal Constitution.”151 As 
a result, courts “[do] not examine the Constitution to decide whether the 
Legislature is permitted to act. Instead, [courts] examine the Constitution to 
determine whether the Legislature is prohibited from acting.”152 
A remedy is required to right a constitutional wrong. The Oklahoma 
Constitution does not prohibit the Oklahoma Legislature from determining 
remedies for violations of the Oklahoma Constitution. Therefore, the silent 
Oklahoma Constitution cannot override the Oklahoma Legislature’s 
enactment of sovereign immunity for constitutional torts, so long as another 
remedy is available.  
Second, nowhere in the Oklahoma Constitution are monetary damages 
mandated for constitutional violations. Accordingly, sovereign immunity as 
to certain constitutional torts does not conflict with the Oklahoma 
Constitution. The remedy required for a legal wrong, like a constitutional 
tort, need not be monetary. Instead, the constitutionally required remedy for 
constitutional torts can be satisfied in one of two ways: (1) suits for 
prospective injunctive relief against a state actor in their individual 
capacity,153 or (2) Ex parte Young154 claims available under federal law.  
B. Realistically the Wrong Result 
While the aforementioned remedies exist, they do not necessarily deter 
the State from continuously violating constitutional rights, nor do they 
equate to a specific remedy to address a specific wrong in all scenarios. The 
limited remedies available for violations of the Oklahoma Constitution 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. art. V, § 36. 
 151. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Daxon, 1980 OK 28, ¶ 16, 607 P.2d 683, 687 
(citing Spearman v. Williams, 1966 OK 33, 415 P.2d 597; Dobbs v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of 
Okla. Cty., 1953 OK 159, 257 P.2d 514; Wentz v. Thomas, 1932 OK 636, 15 P.2d 65). 
 152. Ky. Fried Chicken of McAlester v. Snell, 2014 OK 35, ¶ 13, 345 P.3d 351, 355 
(citations omitted).  
 153. See, e.g., Hunsucker v. Fallin, 2017 OK 100, ¶¶ 3–7, 408 P.3d 599, 601–03. 
 154. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Ex parte Young actions are available as a remedy if the 
relevant Oklahoma constitutional violation tracks a federal constitutional violation, both in 
text and interpretation. Similar to § 1983 claims, these also provide citizens a private cause 
of action for the deprivation of their federal constitutional rights by a state actor and may 
give rise to prospective injunctive relief. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015). 
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arguably conflict with the centuries-old idea that a right without a remedy is 
no right at all.155  
Ex parte Young claims are not always available, and even when they are, 
the remedy for these claims is not directly against the state itself. Ex parte 
Young claims are only available if a violation of the Oklahoma Constitution 
is identical to a violation of the United States Constitution, both in text and 
interpretation.156 And even if it is, technically this right of action can only 
vindicate federal constitutional violations.157 Furthermore, certain 
provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution are not identical to any provision 
of the United States Constitution, so a violation of the Oklahoma 
Constitution does not necessarily give rise to an Ex parte Young claim.158  
This leaves suits for prospective injunctive relief against a state actor in 
their individual capacity as the only remedy for particular violations of the 
Oklahoma Constitution. Though this is a remedy, it is not directly against 
the State itself. Thus, a claim barred by the OGTCA can result in a remedy 
being ineffective against the State altogether.  
The remedy of prospective injunctive relief also lacks any deterrent 
effect. In Perry, the Oklahoma Supreme Court implied that a private right 
of action should lie where a constitutional tort lacks any remedy.159 While it 
is technically true that a remedy exists for violations of every Oklahoma 
constitutional provision in the form of prospective injunctive relief, this 
does nothing to right constitutional violations of the past.160 While these 
past violations may factor into a court’s assessment of whether prospective 
injunctive relief is justified,161 the granting of prospective injunctive relief 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (“The government of the United 
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly 
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of 
a vested legal right.”).  
 156. See Young, 209 U.S. at 156.  
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 7 (protecting a cause of action to recover 
damages for injuries resulting in death). 
 159. See Perry v. City of Norman, 2014 OK 119, ¶ 20, 341 P.3d 689, 693. 
 160. See Post v. Kingdom Hall of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 1955 OK 127, ¶ 3, 283 P.2d 528, 
529 (“A court will not entertain an action to enjoin a party from doing that which he has 
already done.”) (quoting Christensen v. Quality Oil Co., 1951 OK 259, ¶ 3, 236 P.2d 673, 
673); Walcott v. Dennes, 1911 OK 285, 116 P. 784, 786 (“Under our procedure, the 
exclusive function of a writ of injunction is to afford only preventive relief; it is powerless to 
correct wrongs or injuries already committed.”) (quoting City of Alma v. Loehr, 22 P. 424, 
424 (Kan. 1889) (syllabus)).  
 161. See, e.g., Dowell v. Pletcher, 2013 OK 50, ¶¶ 7–8, 304 P.3d 457, 460 (noting the 
defendant’s past actions in an assessment of whether injunctive relief is appropriate).  
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simply prevents further constitutional violations and offers no remedy for 
previously violated constitutional rights.  
Imagine that the State of Oklahoma takes a person’s private property in 
violation of article II, section 23 of the Oklahoma Constitution162 for one 
year. During that time, not only is that person deprived of the use and 
enjoyment of their private property, but the State also does significant 
damage to their private property before returning it. Since no federal 
constitutional provision mirrors article II, section 23, the person’s 
Oklahoma constitutional right cannot be vindicated with a § 1983 or Ex 
parte Young action.163 Instead, their only remedy available is to seek 
prospective injunctive relief against the state actor who took their private 
property. But what good would this do? The private property has already 
been returned, and what that person really wants is compensation for the 
loss of use of their property and the damage caused by the State. In this 
scenario, this “remedy” is no remedy at all—at least not effectively. 
Because the only option available to redress this violation of the Oklahoma 
Constitution—prospective injunctive relief—likely cannot be obtained, nor 
do any good, and the harm actually caused by the violation is left 
completely unaddressed.164 Equally concerning is the failure of this 
remedial structure to encourage strict compliance with the Oklahoma 
                                                                                                                 
 162. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 23. The section states: 
No private property shall be taken or damaged for private use, with or without 
compensation, unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of 
necessity, or for drains and ditches across lands of others for agricultural, 
mining, or sanitary purposes, in such manner as may be prescribed by law. 
Id. 
 163. Note that if a § 1983 or Ex parte Young action were available because a federal 
constitutional right mirrored an Oklahoma constitutional right, then technically only the 
federal constitutional right would be vindicated via a successful § 1983 or Ex parte Young 
claim. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 164. As another example, consider article II, section 13 of the Oklahoma Constitution, 
which prohibits imprisonment for a debt, “except for the non-payment of fines and penalties 
imposed for the violation of law.” OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 13. Suppose the State of 
Oklahoma throws a person in prison for nonpayment of a debt in violation of section 13, and 
that person is eventually released a few months later. Since no federal constitutional 
provision exists that mirrors section 13, the person’s Oklahoma constitutional right cannot 
be vindicated with a § 1983 or Ex parte Young action. Instead, their only remedy available is 
to seek prospective injunctive relief against the state actor that unconstitutionally imprisoned 
them for a debt. But, the person has already been released from prison, and what they really 
need to be whole again is compensation for their loss of liberty for the months they were 
unconstitutionally held in prison. The person’s only option to redress this violation of the 
Oklahoma Constitution is prospective injunctive relief, which does nothing to address the 
harm caused by the state actor’s violation of their section 13 Oklahoma constitutional right.  
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Constitution. Why would a state actor change their conduct if they face no 
consequences? 
Rights without remedies may be acceptable in the federal context; 
indeed, neither the United States Constitution nor any federal statute 
mandates that every right enjoy a corresponding remedy.165 This is why 
scholars have construed Chief Justice Marshall’s insistence that all rights 
must have corresponding remedies as a “principle, not an ironclad rule.”166 
This may also be why federal courts are content with prospective injunctive 
relief as the only remedy for many constitutional violations. The Oklahoma 
Constitution, however, is different. It requires a “certain remedy” for every 
wrong and for every injury.167 It explicitly rejects any right-remedy gap. 
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court has knocked the legs out from 
under any meaningful enforcement of this provision,168 the plain language 
of this constitutional provision directs otherwise, and rights without 
remedies generally should violate the Oklahoma Constitution.169 
Moreover, bereft of a legitimate, forceful, and deterrent remedy, a 
constitutional right is feeble; it is at risk of being consumed and effectively 
eliminated. The State’s claim of sovereign immunity as to constitutional 
torts (and the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s approval of this act) leaves many 
Oklahoma constitutional rights feeble, without a true remedy. While the 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Cf. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (providing a mandate for rights with corresponding 
remedies). 
 166. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778 (1991). 
 167. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6. 
 168. The court has explained that article II, section 6 is a mandate to the judiciary, not the 
legislature, and is in no way “intended to deprive the Legislature of the power to abolish 
remedies for future accruing causes of action . . . or to create new remedies for other wrongs 
as in its wisdom it might determine.” Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 1917 OK 47, ¶ 6, 162 P. 
938, 942; see Neal v. Donahue, 1980 OK 82, ¶ 15, 611 P.2d 1125, 1129 (“[T]he doctrine of 
sovereign immunity is not violative of Article II, Section 6, of the Oklahoma Constitution.”); 
Nash v. Baker, 1974 OK CIV APP 19, ¶ 8, 522 P.2d 1335, 1338 (“This section does not 
promise a remedy to every complainant, not even to every complainant who suffers financial 
loss or disadvantage or disappointment, but only to such as have suffered a ‘legal wrong’. It 
does not prevent the Legislature from creating new legal rights (hence, new legal wrongs) or 
from increasing or reducing or changing the scope of such a right or the remedy for its 
violation.”).  
 169. See OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6; Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶ 18, 12 P.3d 
452, 457–58 (“The constitutional guarantee mandates that courts should be open and afford a 
remedy for those wrongs that are recognized by the law of the land.”); see also 3 ROBERT S. 
PECK & NED MILTENBERG, LITIGATING TORT CASES § 29:15 (Sept. 2019 update) (explaining 
that most state courts with right to remedy guarantees misinterpret the original intent of such 
clauses and read them out of their respective constitutions).  
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Barrios Court technically reached the right result, it functionally reached 
the wrong result, by leaving those Oklahoma constitutional rights that may 
only be vindicated with prospective injunctive relief as rights without 
remedies. 
IV. Conclusion  
Keeping with the federal trend, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
significantly reigned in Bosh claims in Barrios by declining to extend these 
claims to violations of article II, sections 7 and 9, and clarifying that Bosh 
claims are a creation of common law, not the Oklahoma Constitution. In 
doing so, the court eliminated the possibility that a private right of action 
exists for violations of all other provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution. 
Additionally, it signaled the death knell of Bosh claims by calling into 
question the validity of all previously recognized Bosh claims, now 
potentially prevented by the 2014 OGTCA Amendments. 
What remains to be seen, however, is how the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
will treat constitutional torts that lack a remedy under federal law and those 
that only allow prospective injunctive relief under state law. The court did 
not address this situation in Barrios at all. Yet in Perry, the court implied 
that a private right of action should lie where a constitutional tort lacks any 
remedy.170 Moreover, the Oklahoma Constitution mandates that all wrongs 
be afforded a remedy.171 While technically a remedy exists for violations of 
every Oklahoma constitutional provision—prospective injunctive relief—
this only prevents future harm, and does nothing to right the constitutional 
violation of the past. The sufficiency of this solely forward-looking 
“remedy” is suspect, and it has little to no deterrent effect on state actors. 
While, in form, a remedy exists for constitutional violations in these 
scenarios, in function, this can be viewed as a right without a remedy. If the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court ever considers such a case, it will be forced to 
confront a constitutional provision and precedents it may not have realized 
were in conflict: (1) article II, section 6’s requirement that all rights have a 
remedy, as well as its holding in Perry that implied all constitutional torts 
require a remedy,172 and (2) its holding in Barrios that validated the 
Legislature’s adoption of the State’s sovereign immunity for all 
constitutional torts, even where the only available “remedy” is prospective 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See Perry v. City of Norman, 2014 OK 119, ¶ 20, 341 P.3d 689, 693. 
 171. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 6. 
 172. See Perry, ¶ 20, 341 P.3d at 693. 
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injunctive relief.173 If it has the opportunity, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
should directly address whether prospective injunctive relief actually 
remedies previously violated constitutional rights. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court will likely continue to face tough 
questions in this area of law. It has been clear, however, that the future of 
monetary remedies for constitutional tort damages rests in the hands of 
Oklahomans through their power to elect the Legislature. The OGTCA’s 
bar of monetary remedies for certain constitutional torts may not technically 
conflict with the Oklahoma Constitution. A remedy for all legal wrongs—
including constitutional torts—is required, and remedies—however 
insufficient or ineffective—do exist.  
The Oklahoma Constitution leaves the determination of remedies for 
constitutional torts to the Oklahoma Legislature. If the Legislature’s 
determination is not satisfactory to the People, the Oklahoma Constitution 
could be amended to require a monetary remedy for constitutional 
violations, or the OGTCA could be amended to eliminate sovereign 
immunity for constitutional torts. Thanks to Barrios, the jurisprudence of 
sovereign immunity and constitutional torts has been un-muddled enough 
for the people to decide for themselves whether their Oklahoma 




                                                                                                                 
 173. Barrios v. Haskell Cty. Pub. Facilities Auth., 2018 OK 90, ¶¶ 13 n.21, 18, 432 P.3d 
233, 239 n.21, 241. 
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